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This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in 
a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their 
life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, 
we consider a model where for each period of retirement separate contracts can be 
purchased. Demand for the two periods can be decided either sequentially or 
simultaneously. We show that only a situation where all risk types choose sequential 
contracts can be an equilibrium and that this outcome is favourable for the long-living, 
but is unfavourable for the short-living individuals.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Social security systems, which in many industrialised countries are organised according to 
the pay-as-you-go method, are threatened by the ageing of the population due to a decrease 
in fertility and an increase in life expectancy. This problem is recognised by academics as 
well as by politicians, and several possible measures to maintain the financial stability of the 
system are suggested. One of these measures is a reduction of the pension payments, and it 
seems in fact unavoidable that it will be implemented to some degree. If this is the case, then 
a natural strategy for the individuals is to raise private provision for retirement, in particular by 
an increased purchase of life annuities. As governments want to prevent old-age poverty, 
they tend to encourage private pension insurance through tax incentives.
1 
 
However, there are concerns that the market for annuities does not offer a suitable 
supplement to the public pension system. One obvious argument is that it cannot incorporate 
redistribution, as the public system does for several reasons. Another argument concentrates 
on the phenomenon of adverse selection, which is a common problem that affects the 
efficient working of insurance markets. The present paper studies this problem in the context 
of specifically designed contracts for old-age insurance. 
 
Generally, adverse selection occurs with asymmetric information, that is, when the insurer 
has less information than the individual as to the probability that the insured event occurs. In 
case of annuities, this means that companies have less information on life expectancy of an 
annuitant than the individual herself. As a consequence, returns from annuities cannot reflect 
individual life expectancy but only overall life expectancy, which in turn will induce high-risk 
individuals (that is, the long-living) to buy more annuities than low-risk individuals. This is the 
standard observation, discussed in various contributions to the literature (see, e.g., Pauly 
1974, Eckstein et al. 1985, Abel 1986, Mitchell et al. 1999, Walliser 2000). 
 
However, there is a further consequence of the adverse-selection problem, namely that the 
time structure of the benefits matters. Individuals with low life expectancy put less weight on 
pension payouts in later periods than individuals with high life expectancy. This aspect is 
                                                  
1   Tax incentives are granted in many industrialised countries, e. g. in Great Britain, U.S.A, Canada and Sweden. 
Moreover, the recent reform of social security in Germany aims at cutting public pensions and inducing 
individuals, by granting a tax release, to contribute four percent of income to private old-age insurance. 
Similarly, in Austria contributions to private old-age insurance are subsidised by a premium since 2000.   2
neglected in the usual overlapping-generations model with one working period and one 
period of retirement. But in reality the time of retirement must not be seen as a single, 
homogeneous period, for which provision can be made through a once-and-for-all contract 
only, with a fixed and constant (in nominal or real terms) payout. Planning individuals, being 
aware of some estimate of their life expectancy, will attempt to make provision in accordance 
with this estimate, which means that they want to use more differentiated instruments. In 
practice, they can buy an insurance contract with payouts increasing or decreasing over 
time, or they can buy a limited-time contract for the earlier phase of retirement and then use 
another instrument to provide for the rest of their lifetime.
2 
 
In order to analyse the consequences on the functioning of the annuity market of the fact that 
the time structure of the payouts matters, one has to extend the standard model by assuming 
that retirement consists of more periods and that provision can be made separately for each 
of them. Brunner and Pech (2005) introduce a model with one working period and two 
periods of retirement, where two groups of individuals with differing life expectancy buy an 
annuity contract which runs for the whole time of retirement, but with payouts possibly 
varying over time.
3 It is shown that in this framework an equilibrium in the sense of Nash-
Cournot may but need not exist.
4 
 
In the present contribution we consider a similar model, but with different types of contracts. 
We again assume that individuals live for one working period and for at most two periods of 
retirement, but now contracts run for one period only; for the second period, a new contract 
has to be bought. By this formulation we take account of the fact that in reality term-insured 
pension contracts exist, which provide payouts only for a limited time, given that the 
individual is alive. For the rest some other form of provision must be made.
5  
                                                  
2   Poterba (1997) emphasizes the importance of the wide range of different annuity products for the growth of 
the U.S. annuity market. He provides a typology of individual annuities with respect to the terms under which 
accumulated capital is dispersed during the liquidation phase. In particular, he distinguishes between two 
broad classes of individual annuities, that are deferred and immediate annuities, depending on whether there 
is a waiting period between the premium payment and the beginning of the annuity payouts or not.  
The role of annuity contracts with escalating payouts in the U.K. annuity market is studied by Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002). 
3   Yagi and Nishigaki (1993) also employed a model with one working period and two periods of retirement in 
order to discuss optimal insurance demand of a representative individual. They showed that constant annuity 
payouts over time are inefficient, given that the individual rate of time preference differs from the interest rate. 
However, they did not consider the adverse-section problem and its impact on the existence of equilibria.  
4   With these life annuities, firms can separate individuals according to their life expectancy by a variation of the 
payouts over time. In fact, only a separating equilibrium (compare Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) can occur.  
5   Townley and Boadway (1987) studied the functioning of the annuity market when individuals save out of their 
payouts from the limited-time pension contract. In contrast, we consider the case that they can buy a second 
annuity to provide for the remaining time.    3
 
The important issue which we address is that individuals can choose between two strategies 
to provide for the second period of retirement: simultaneously, that is, individuals buy an 
additional contract already in the working period, or sequentially, that is, only those 
individuals who have survived to the first period of retirement, purchase an additional 
contract on the spot market. We show that in our model individuals in general chose only one 
of these alternatives, depending on the prices. However, in a first-best equilibrium, prices 
that then correspond to the individual life expectancies assume such values which make 
individuals indifferent between the two alternatives, because each provides the same 
consumption path over lifetime. 
 
This is no longer true if asymmetric information, where prices are distorted by adverse 
selection, is introduced in our model. Then, under the assumption of price competition 
between annuity companies, the price for any contract is the same for both risk-groups, and 
only a situation where both groups buy the same type of second-period contract is feasible. 
Further, it turns out that the type of contract chosen to provide for the second period of 
retirement also affects the price of the first-period contract. In particular, we find that the two 
strategies have differing consequences for the welfare of the individuals, because they allow 
different consumption paths over the time of retirement: long-living individuals, who put more 
weight on consumption in the second period, prefer the regime when all individuals make 
sequential provision, while short-living individuals prefer the regime with simultaneous 
provision. Assuming that insurance companies can credibly commit in the working period to 
offer contracts at a pre-specified price, we find that only the former regime, favourable to the 
long-living individuals, represents a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. This result is puzzling 
because empirical evidence shows that in fact term-limited contracts represent a small share 
of annuity contracts (see, e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999). We discuss possible explanations for 
this puzzle in the concluding remarks.  
 
In the following Section 2 we introduce the basic model and show that either simultaneous or 
sequential annuity contracts are chosen. We characterise demand in both cases. In Section 
3 we analyse the consequences of adverse selection for annuity prices and for the existence 
of an equilibrium. Moreover, we study consumption and welfare of the individuals. Section 4 
provides a discussion of the results. 
 
   4
2. Sequential and simultaneous demand for annuities 
 
Consider an economy with H individuals who live for a maximum of three periods t = 0,1,2. In 
the working period t = 0, each individual earns a fixed labour income w0. At the end of period 
0 she retires and lives for at most two further periods. Survival to the retirement period t = 1 
occurs with probability 
i
1 π ,  1 0
i
1 < π < . In the same way, given that an individual is alive in 
period 1, survival to period 2 occurs with probability 
i
2 π ,  1 0
i
2 < π < .  
 
Provision for old age can be made through three types of annuity contracts, which are 
offered by insurance companies:  
-   A1 denotes the quantity of a contract, which is bought at a price Q1 in working period 0 
and offers an immediate payout A1 in retirement period 1. 
-   A2 denotes the quantity of a contract, which is bought at a price Q2 in retirement period 1 
and offers an immediate payout A2 in retirement period 2. 
-   D2 denotes the quantity of a contract, which is bought at a price R2 in working period 0 and 
offers a deferred payout D2 in retirement period 2. 
 
That is, each type of contract offers payouts for one period of retirement, but they differ in the 
date of purchase and the waiting period for the payout to begin: provision for retirement 
period 1 is made through A1, while provision for retirement period 2 can be made through A2 
(bought by those only, who survive to retirement period 1) and/or through D2 (bought already 
in the working period). Q1, Q2 and R2 are the corresponding prices (premiums, resp.) per unit 
of annuity payout; the reciprocal of each price represents the rate of return on each contract 
type.  
 
We assume that the individuals have no bequest motive, which means that saving is not an 
attractive strategy for them to provide for old-age. This follows from the fact that the rate of 
return of annuities is higher than the interest rate, as annuities allow to avoid (and 
redistribute) unintended bequests (see Yaari 1965). Further, in order to concentrate on the 
design of the annuity contracts and to simplify the analysis, the assumption is made that no 





00 1 1 2 2 cwQ A R D =− − .   (2.1) 
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Moreover, given that individual i is alive in the retirement period 1, she can spend an amount 
i
22 Q A  from her income 
i
1 A  in order to make additional provision for consumption in the 
retirement period 2, and consumes an amount 
i
1 c . This gives us the budget equations for the 




112 2 cAQ A =− ,  (2.2) 
 
iii
222 cAD =+ . (2.3) 
 
Preferences over lifetime consumption of an individual i are time-separable and are 
represented by expected utility with a per-period utility function u depending on consumption. 
An individual i is confronted with the following two-stage decision problem: in the working 
period 0, she decides on the quantities 
i
1 A  and 
i
2 D  of annuities, thus on her consumption 
level in period 0 and on her income 
i
t w  in each of the two retirement periods t = 1,2. For this 
decision she takes into account her optimal annuity demand 
i
2 A  and her optimal 
consumption levels in periods 1 and 2, about which she will decide in period 1, given that 
then she is alive. Formally, this two-stage problem can be written as:  
 
  t = 0: 
ii i i i
o 1 122 max u(c ) (A ,Q ,D ), +πϕ  (2.4) 
     s. t. (2.1), 
 






1 π +  (2.5) 





i ii i i i i i i i i i
122 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 c, c, A
(A ,Q ,D ) max {u(c ) u(c ) c A Q A , c D A } ϕ≡+ π = − = + . 
 
Concerning the A2-contract, we in fact assume that the individuals are informed about its 
price Q2 already in the working period 0, in other words, that the insurance companies can 
credibly commit to offer those contracts at a price Q2 one period later. Otherwise ϕ
i would not 
be well-defined.
6 Further, we assume  0 ) c ( u
i
t > ′ , 0 ) c ( u
i




. Notice that the 
specification of the decision problem means that the individuals do not discount future 
consumption for any reason other than risk aversion.
7 
 
                                                  
6   We leave it to the concluding section to discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption, e.g. that the 
individuals are uncertain in the working period about the future price level Q2, due to missing instruments of 
credible commitment by the firms. 
7   To simplify notation, we do not include a time preference parameter explicitly in the utility function. To do so, 
would mean that a per-period discount factor enters (2.4) and (2.5) just in the same way as the survival 
probabilities. Nothing would change with the results.    6
By inserting (2.1) into (2.4) and differentiating with respect to 
i
1 A  and 
i
2 D  as well as inserting 
(2.2) and (2.3) into (2.5) and differentiating with respect to 
i
2 A , we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker 
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2 >   and   
ii i
ii i 122
20 1 1 2 21 i
2
(A ,Q ,D )
Ru ' ( w QA RD) 0
D
∂ϕ
−− − + π =
∂
 or  (2.7a) 
  0 D
i
2 =  and   
ii i
ii i 122
20 1 1 2 21 i
2
(A ,Q ,D )
Ru ' ( w QA RD) 0
D
∂ϕ





2 >  and   
ii i i i
21 2 2222 Qu ' ( A QA) u ' ( D A) 0 −− + π + =  or  (2.8a) 
 
  0 A
i
2 =  and   
ii i i i
21 2 2222 Qu ' ( A QA) u ' ( D A) 0 −− + π + ≤ , (2.8b) 
 

























.  (2.10) 
 
Obviously, an individual i always has a positive annuity demand 
i
1 A  for the first-period 
contract, since this is the only possibility to provide for first-period consumption. But she can 
decide either to buy the immediate annuity contract (i.e.  0 A
i
2 > ,  0 D
i
2 = ) or the deferred 
contract (i.e.  0 A
i
2 = , 0 D
i
2 > ) or both kind of contracts (i.e.  0 A
i
2 > , 0 D
i
2 > ) in order to 
make provision for consumption in the second retirement period. The following Lemma 
shows that the latter case is in general excluded. 
 
Lemma 1: In general, it is not optimal for an individual i to choose both  0 D
i
2 >  and  0 A
i
2 > . 
The inequality Q1Q2 > R2 (Q1Q2 < R2) implies  0 D
i
2 >  and  0 A
i
2 =  ( 0 A
i
2 >  and  0 D
i
2 = , 
resp.). 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
In order to receive one unit of payout in the second retirement period, the individual has to 
invest Q2 units into the A2-contract in the first retirement period and hence Q1Q2 units of   7
income into the A1-contract in the working period. On the other hand, R2 units of income 
invested (in the working period) into the D2-contract transforms into one unit of payout in the 
second retirement period. Therefore, the decisive relation is Q1Q2 < > R2, whether provision for 
the second period of retirement is made through an A2- or a D2-contract. Only in case of 
Q1Q2 = R2, the individuals would be indifferent between both types of contracts. For the 
remainder of this section we rule out this specific parameter constellation, but we distinguish 
between the two different situations whether an individual expresses annuity demand 
sequentially or simultaneously. In the first case of sequential annuity demand, the purchase 
of 
i
t A , t = 1,2, arises from a two-stage decision process, whose optimal solution is 





2 D  are determined by the first-order conditions (2.6) and (2.7a).  
 
The following two Lemmas characterise how prices and the survival probabilities influence 
annuity demand in both cases. 
 
Lemma 2:  
(i)   In case of sequential annuity demand, i.e.  0 A
i
1 > , 0 A
i
2 > , 0 D
i



















































2 ε  denotes the price elasticity of annuity demand 
i
2 A  for constant 
i
1 A . 
 
(ii)  In case of simultaneous annuity demand, i.e.  0 A
i
1 > , 0 A
i
2 = , 0 D
i






















_ 0 if 
i
1 η <











_ 0 if 
i
2 η <














1 η  denotes the price elasticity of annuity demand 
i
1 A  for constant 
i
2 D  and 
i
2 η  the 
price elasticity of annuity demand 
i
2 D  for constant 
i
1 A.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
   8
We find the usual result that demand for an annuity contract decreases, if its price rises. 
However, demand may but need not react in the same way, if the price of the other contract 
rises. The reasoning for the cross-price effects in case of sequential demand is the following: 
An increase in Q1 reduces demand for the A1-contract and hence income 
ii
11 wA =  in 
retirement period 1, out of which the A2-contract has to be financed. The individual adapts to 
the decrease in 
i
1 w  (which would mean a reduction of 
i
1 c  in case of unchanged 
i
2 A ) by 
decreasing demand for the A2-contract (and thus consumption 
i
2 c  as well). The cross-price 
effect 
i
12 AQ ∂∂ follows from related arguments: In this case, it is essential how a change in 
Q2 affects consumption 
i
1 c  holding 
i
1 A  for the moment. Note that, although 
i
22 AQ0 ∂∂< , 
obviously, the expenditures 
i
22 Q A  for the A2-contract and hence 
i
1 c  for fixed 
i
1 A  may de- or 
increase, depending on the price elasticity 
i
2 ε  of demand 
i
2 A  for fixed 
ii
11 wA = . If Q2 
increases and 
i
2 ε  is larger than -1, then 
i
22 QA increases, which means a reduction of 
i
1 c . 
Then it is optimal for the individual to shift part of the reduction to the working period 0 by 
decreasing 
i
0 c  and increasing demand for the A1-contract. By the same argument, it is 
optimal for an individual to leave demand for the A1-contract unchanged, if 
i
2 1 ε= −, and to 
decrease demand 
i
1 A,  i f  
i
2 1 ε< − 
i
1 A.   
 
Analogous considerations apply for the cross-price effects in the case of simultaneous 
demand: The relevant issue is how an increase of the price Q1 and R2, resp., directly affects 
expenditures 
i
11 Q A  and 
i
22 R D , resp. (with demand for the other contract held constant). If 
expenditures increase (
i
t 1 η> −), then part of the implied reduction of consumption 
i
0 c i n  t h e  
working period is shifted to the respective other period through a reduction of the 
corresponding annuity demand; and analogous for elasticities 
i
t 1 η ≤− . 
 
Lemma 3:  
(i)   In case of sequential annuity demand, i.e.  0 A
i
1 > , 0 A
i
2 > , 0 D
i













































(ii)   In case of simultaneous annuity demand, i.e.  0 A
i
1 > , 0 A
i
2 = , 0 D
i













































Proof: See Appendix. 
 
We find that generally annuity demand reacts positively, if any probability of survival 
increases. However, there is an essential difference between the two cases, which concerns 
the cross effect of 
i
2 π  on the first-period contract. With sequential decisions, an increase of 
the probability of survival to the second period of retirement increases demand 
i
1 A , because 
this allows to buy more insurance for period 2. On the other hand, with simultaneous 
decisions an increase of 
i
2 π  means that insurance for the first period of retirement is 
substituted by insurance for the second period of retirement. Note further that an increase in 
i




1π π  of survival to the second period as well, hence 
demand for the second-period contracts rises in both cases. 
 
 
3.  Adverse selection in the annuity market  
 
Having described the two possible strategies to provide for old age, namely through 
sequential and simultaneous annuity demand, we now study the implications of asymmetric 
information on the functioning of the annuity market. Let from now the otherwise identical 
individuals be divided into two groups i = L,H, characterised by different risks of a long life, 




t π > π  for t = 1,2. Let γ0 and 1 − γ0, resp., denote the 
shares of the high-risk and low-risk individuals in period 0, with 0 < γ0 < 1.  
 
First, as a point of reference we consider the case that there is perfect information about the 
survival probabilities. Then, obviously, perfect competition among the insurance firms, 
ensures that each type of individuals receive their individually fair contracts. An annuity is 
said to be individually fair, if expected payouts equal its price. This requires for the A1-, A2- 




tt Q0 −π = , t = 1,2,  (3.1) 
 
ii i
21 2 R0 −ππ = . (3.2) 
   10
hold. Clearly, this implies that the annuity companies make zero expected profits, given that 
identical individuals buy these contracts. 
 
Lemma 4: Given individually fair contracts, any individual is indifferent between choosing an 
A2- or D2-contract for the second period of retirement. She chooses the same level of 
consumption in every period t = 0,1,2. 
 
Proof: The zero-profit conditions (3.1), (3.2) imply Q1Q2  = R 2, which is the condition for 
indifference, as mentioned after Lemma 1. Considering (2.6) – (2.10), one observes that the 






0 = = , irrespective of the chosen contracts.
    Q . E . D .  
 
In a first-best world, where every individual can buy an annuity contract whose price is 
precisely adjusted to her life expectancy, it does not matter, which type of contract is chosen 
for provision for the second period of retirement. Each offers an optimal smoothing of 
consumption. However, in reality, lack of information prevents the supply of first-best 
contracts.  
 
We introduce asymmetric information into the model in the usual way: The probabilities 
i
t π  
and  γ0 are public information, known by the annuity companies. But it is the private 
information for each individual to know her type, i.e. her probability of survival. As a 
consequence, there is an adverse-selection problem in the annuity market. Moreover, we 
assume that there is perfect competition among the annuity companies and that they cannot 
monitor whether consumers buy annuities from other insurance companies, which seems to 
be a reasonable assumption frequently made for the annuity market (see e.g. Pauly 1974, 
Abel 1986, Brugiavini 1993, Walliser 2000, Brunner and Pech 2005).
8 This assumption 
means that firms fix the price of a contract and individuals can buy as many annuities of each 
contract as they want. It follows that in equilibrium for each contract only one price, paid by 
both types of individuals, can exist in each period t = 1,2. As a consequence, the first-best 
                                                  
8   Price and quantity competition, where firms offer a number of different contracts which specify both a price 
and a quantity, needs as a prerequisite that individuals can buy at most one contract. This is regarded to be 
appropriate for some insurance markets, e.g. insurance against accidents, but not for the annuity market. 
However, price and quantity competition generates the possibility of a separating equilibrium (see Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977).   11
solution is unsustainable, because the individually fair prices of the A1-, A2- and D2-contract 
as defined by (3.1) and (3.2) are lower for type-L individuals than for type-H individuals.
9 
 
Both types of individuals buy the same contract, which is called a pooling situation. 
Moreover, the same argument implies that only a situation, where both groups use the same 
type of contract in order to provide for the second period of retirement, can prevail. That is, 
either both groups use the A2-contract for the second period of retirement or both groups use 
the D2-contract. This follows from the fact that only one price Q1 for the first-period contract 
A1 can exist, and that each group chooses either the A2- or the D2-contract, depending on 
whether Q1Q2  < > R2 (see Lemma 1). Thus we distinguish between two different regimes, 
where all individuals demand either sequential or simultaneous pooling contracts: 
 
  sequential regime:   0 A
i
1 > , 0 A
i
2 > , 0 D
i
2 =   for i = L, H,  
  simultaneous regime: 0 A
i
1 > , 0 A
i
2 = , 0 D
i
2 >   for i = L, H. 
 
As a next step we discuss, to which extent the adverse-selection problem matters in the two 
regimes, that is, whether individuals with a long life expectancy buy a larger amount of the 
different types of contracts.  
 
Lemma 5:  
(i)   In the sequential regime, for any prices Q1,Q2, an individual with high survival 
probabilities demands larger quantities of annuities than an individuals with low survival 
probabilities, i. e. 
HL
t1 2 t1 2 A (Q ,Q ) A (Q ,Q ), >  t = 1,2.  
(ii)   In the simultaneous regime, for any prices Q1,R2, an individual with high survival 
probabilities demands a larger quantity D2 than an individual with low survival 
probabilities, i.e. 
HL
21 2 21 2 D( Q , R) D( Q , R) > . The ratio of demand for the A1-contract is 
undetermined. 
 




t π < π , t = 1,2.  Q.E.D. 
 
                                                  
9   That both types of individuals buy the same contract could be called a pooling situation. However, in a strict 
sense, this term refers to a framework where in principle the groups could be separated through appropriate 
instruments, e.g. through price and quantity competition.    12
If the problem of adverse selection is defined by the criterion that the ratio of aggregate 
group-H demand to aggregate group-L demand exceeds the ratio of group shares 
) /( 0 0 1 γ − γ , we find that this problem certainly occurs for both contracts in the sequential 
regime; in the simultaneous regime it occurs for the second-period contract, while for the 
first-period contract it is mitigated by the fact that an increase of 
i
2 π  decreases demand for 
the A1-contract. 
 
3.1 Prices in both regimes 
The consequence of the over-representation of high-risk individuals among aggregate 
annuity demand is that in equilibrium insurance companies charge a price which is higher 
than the actuarially fair price corresponding to the average probability of survival of the 
population. The respective prices are determined by the condition that, due to the 
assumption of perfect competition in the annuity market, the expected profits of a contract, 
bought by both groups L and H, must be equal to zero. As 
i
t π  is the expected payout for 




0 1 11 0 1 11 (1 )A (Q ) A (Q ) 0 −γ −π +γ −π = . (3.3) 
 
Since type-H individuals have a higher probability to survive to retirement period 1, i.e. 
H
1 π  > 
L






01 0 1 (1 )
γπ
γ≡
γπ + − γ π
,   (3.4) 
 
while the share of type-L individuals reduces to (1  − γ1). Thus relatively more type-H 





122 2 1 2 2 2 (1 )A (Q ) A (Q ) 0 −γ −π +γ −π = . (3.5) 
 
In the simultaneous regime, where the A1-contract is supplemented by the D2-contract, the 
expected payout from the latter is 
ii
12 ππ , and the zero-profit condition reads 
 
 
LL L HH H
022 1 2 0 22 1 2 (1 )D (R ) D (R ) 0 −γ −π π +γ −π π = . (3.6)   13
 
Note that the prices cannot be computed explicitly from (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6), because in 
each equation annuity demand depends on the respective prices. Nevertheless, if one takes 
the ratio of aggregate demand of group H to that of group L as exogenous for the moment, 
one observes that the respective price is higher, the larger this ratio.  
 
For a more detailed study of the functioning of the annuity market, when there is asymmetric 
information and annuity companies can offer both kinds of second-period contracts, namely 
immediate as well as deferred annuities, we assume from now on that instantaneous utility is 
logarithmic, i.e. 
 




t =  for t = 0,1,2.    (3.7) 
 
Logarithmic utility has the convenient property that most cross-price effects are zero (as 
ii
2t ,1 εη = − , see Lemma 2). This property keeps explicit computation of the zero-profit prices 
in either regime simple.
10 In the following, a tilde refers to the sequential regime, while a bar 
refers to the simultaneous regime. 
 
Sequential regime: The conditions (2.6) and (2.8a) together with (2.9) determine annuity 
demand 
i
1 A ~  and 
i















































































 ,   (3.10) 
 
                                                  
10   In the concluding section we will discuss the consequences for our results of assuming a general 
utility function.    14
Simultaneous regime: By use of (A20), (A20) in the Appendix and (3.7) we obtain annuity 
demand 
i
1 A  for the first-period contract and annuity demand 
i
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With these formulas, we are able to compare the composition of aggregate demand and the 
prices in the two regimes.  
 
Lemma 6: The following relations hold 
(i)   between the ratios of aggregate annuity demand of group H to that of group L for the 
different types of contracts:  1 ~ ρ  >  1 ρ ,  2 ~ ρ  >  2 ρ ,  1 ~ ρ  <  2 ρ . 
(ii)  between the prices for the different types of contracts:  i
1 Q  >  1 Q,   i
2 Q  >  2 R,   i i
12 QQ  <  2 R.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The inequalities  1 ~ ρ  >  1 ρ  and  i
1 Q  >  1 Q  indicate that the adverse-selection problem for the 
first-period contract is more severe in the sequential regime than in the simultaneous regime 
(compare the discussion after Lemma 5). The intuitive reason for this result is the following: 
in the simultaneous regime, annuity demand 
i
1 A  for the first-period contract satisfies only the 
need for future consumption in period 1. In contrast, in the sequential regime, annuity 
demand 
i
1 A ~  for the first-period contract has to satisfy the need for future consumption in both 
retirement periods 1 and 2, since part of the payouts 
i
1 A ~  is used for the demand 
i
2 A ~ . High-
risk individuals choose a higher demand 
i
2 A ~  than low risk-individuals (see Lemma 5), which 
in turn intensifies adverse selection for the first-period contract.    15
 
The essential reason, why  2 ~ ρ  >  2 ρ  and  i
2 Q >   2 R  hold, is that from period 0 (when the D2-
contract is bought) to period 1 (when the A2-contract is bought) the share of the high-risk 




1 π < π . As the ratio of individual 








2 D D A ~ A ~ = , see 
(3.8) and (3.11)], these shares indeed are responsible for the higher price of the A2-contract 
compared to that of the D2-contract.  
 
A further important result of Lemma 6 is the inequality  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R . Remember that  i i
12 QQ  is 
the price in the sequential regime which must be paid in the working period in order to 
receive one unit of payout in the second retirement period. It is smaller than  2 R , the 
corresponding price in the simultaneous regime. This can be explained by the fact that in the 
former regime provision for period 2 is made via the first-period contract A1, which is bought 
by the low-risk individuals to a larger extent than the D2-contract (note that  1 ~ ρ  <  2 ρ ). In other 
words, in the sequential regime the high-risk individuals, when insuring for the second period, 
benefit from being for the first period in a pool with the low-risk individuals, who put particular 
weight on insurance for this period, due to their short life expectancy. In a sense, this result 
represents the counterpart to the above argument explaining why  i
1 Q  >  1 Q.   
 
3.2 Equilibrium  
Now we turn to an analysis of whether either or both of the two regimes constitute an 
equilibrium. We call a set of contracts an equilibrium in the sense of Nash-Cournot, if 
together with annuity demand of both groups i = L,H the respective zero-profit condition for 
each contract is fulfilled and if no other contract exists, which is preferred by at least one 
group i ∈ {L,H} and which allows a nonnegative profit.  
 
Proposition 1: The sequential contracts with prices  i i
12 Q ,Q  represent an equilibrium. 
 
Proof: If the A1-contract were offered at a price Q1 <  i
1 Q , both groups would buy that and the 
insurance company would make a loss. (Note that  1 ρ   is independent of Q1 (see (3.10)), 
hence  i
1 Q  is the unique payout which fulfils the zero-profit condition (3.5)). By the same 
argument, an insurance company offering an A2-contract with price Q2 <  i
2 Q  would make a 
loss. 
   16
Finally, if an alternative D2-contract with a price R2 <  i i
12 QQ  was offered, again both groups 
would buy that (see Lemma 1) and the insurance company would make a loss. This follows 
from the fact that  2 R  does not depend on Q1 (see (3.12)) and the zero-profit conditions imply 
2 R >   i i
12 QQ  (see Lemma 6 (ii)).   Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2: The simultaneous contracts with prices  12 Q ,R  do not constitute an 
equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Given the simultaneous contracts, an insurance company can additionally offer a 
sequential A2-contract with price  i
2 Q . Indeed, as  2 ρ   and consequently  i
2 Q  do not depend on 
Q1 [see (3.9) and (3.10)], firms make a nonnegative profit by this offer. We know that 
1 Q <   i
1 Q  and  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R  from Lemma 6. Hence  i
2 1 QQ  <   2 R , which means that any 
individual will accept the offer (see Lemma 1).  Q.E.D. 
 
Remember that it is in the working period 0 when an individual opts either for the D2- or the 
A2-contract. Hence, the assumption made in Section 2.1 that in period 0 insurance 
companies can credibly commit to offer the sequential contract with price  i
2 Q  one period 
later, is essential for these results. This issue will be discussed further in the concluding 
section 4.  
 
Intuitively there are two reasons why the sequential regime with prices  ii
12 Q ,Q  constitutes an 
equilibrium: i) From the above results we know that the sequential regime allows provision for 
the second retirement period at a lower price. Thus, it is plausible that no better D2-contract 
can be offered without making a loss. ii) No lower price than  i
1 Q  can be granted for the A1-
contract, in view of the fact that individuals use part of the returns from this A1-contract to 
provide for the second period via the A2-contract.  
 
Conversely, the simultaneous regime with prices  12 Q ,R  is not an equilibrium, because firms 
can additionally offer an A2-contract at a price  i
2 Q , which combined with the existing A1-
contract with price  1 Q  allows provision for both retirement periods at a lower price. 
(Obviously however, the existing A1-contract with return  1 Q  would make a loss in this case, 
because  i
1 Q  is the lowest price compatible with sequential contracts.)  
 
   17
3.3 Welfare analysis 
In a final step of our analysis, we study welfare of both types of individuals i = L,H in the two 
regimes, in order to find out whether the equilibrium outcome - the sequential contracts - is a 
favourable solution for one or both risk groups. We start the analysis by comparing optimal 
consumption levels in each regime.  
 
Lemma 7:  
(i)    In working period 0, the consumption level 
i
0 c  of any individual i L,H, is the same 
irrespective whether she chooses sequential or simultaneous annuity contracts.  
(ii)  In retirement period 1, consumption of any individual i = L,H, is lower in the sequential 
regime than in the simultaneous regime, i.e.  i i ii
12 11 1 2 c( Q, Q) c( Q, R) <  for i = L,H.  
(iii)  In retirement period 2, consumption of any individual i = L,H, is higher in the sequential 
regime than in the simultaneous regime, i.e.  i i ii
12 22 1 2 c( Q , Q) c( Q , R) >  for i = L,H.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Note that part (i) of Lemma 7 holds for any contracts with prices Q1,Q2 and Q1,R2, since for 
logarithmic utility the expenditures for annuities in working period do not depend on prices, 
i.e 
i
11 QA   = 
i
11 QA  +  
i
22 R D  for any Q1, Q2, R2. Hence it is optimal for an individual to invest the 
same amount 
i
00 wc −  into old-age provision in either regime. However, the prices influence 
the level of consumption in both retirement periods. Particularly, we find that the relations 
i
1 Q  >  1 Q,  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R , as shown in Lemma 6 (ii), are in fact decisive for the distribution of 
consumption over the two periods of retirement in the two regimes. With the sequential 
regime, more consumption is postponed to the second period of retirement, while the 
simultaneous regime induces individuals to consume relatively more in the first period of 
retirement. Altogether, it follows that it is unclear from the results of Lemma 7, in which 
regime an individual of type i is better off. In order to answer this question, we first determine 
the consumption possibility curves for period 1 and 2.  
 
The consumption possibility curves, abbreviated by 
i
SE CPC  for the sequential regime and by 
i








2 D,  r e s p . ,  
and combining budget equations (2.1) – (2.3), where 
i
2 D0 =  and 
i




SE CPC :  ii iii
12 00 1 2 wcQ cQ c −= + . (3.14)   18
 
i
SI CPC : 
iii
00 1 12 2 wcQ cR c −= +  (3.15) 
 
We use the convenient property that in either regime an individual consumes the same 
amount 
i




1 c , c) -
space (see Figure 1 and 2). 
i




1 c , c)  f o r  
an individual i who invests the fixed amount  i ii
1 00 1 wcQ A −=  into the first-period contract. She 
can consume all payouts  i ii
1 10 0 c( wc ) Q =−  in period 1 or transform part of it into second-
period consumption, by buying the sequential second-period contract at price  i
2 Q . If she 
transforms everything, then  i i ii
12 20 0 c( wc ) ( Q Q ) =−  results. On the hand, the 
i
SI CPC  
represents all feasible consumption bundles for an individual i who invests the same amount 
i
00 wc −  (in the working period 0!) into the A1- and D2-contract. Hence, in this regime, the 
trade-off between consumption in period 1 and in period 2 is  12 QR − , which is price ratio for 











1 π +  subject to respective consumption 
possibility set.   
 
Figure 1  Figure 2 
 
A comparison of the consumption possibility curves in both regimes demonstrates that 
i
SI CPC  is flatter than 
i
SE CPC , because  i
2 12 QQ R <  due to Lemma 6. This inequality is 
responsible for the fact that relative consumption 
ii
21 cc  is lower in the simultaneous regime 
than in the sequential regime, as shown in Lemma 7. Further, the curve 
i
SI CPC  crosses the 
i
1 c -axis at a higher level than the curve 
i
SE CPC , since  1 Q <   i
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crossing with the 
i
2 c -axis, since  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R . It follows that the CPC's intersect and that the 
sequential regime allows higher consumption to the left of the point of intersection, but lower 
consumption to the right. This property is essential for following result on welfare: 
 
Proposition 3: An individual of type L is better off in the simultaneous regime with prices 
12 Q ,R , while an individual of type H is better off in the sequential regime with prices  i i
12 Q,Q .  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
We give a graphical illustration of Proposition 3 in Figure 3, where the consumption 
possibility curves (3.14) and (3.15) of both types of individuals i = L,H are drawn, denoted by 
L
SE CPC  and 
L
SI CPC  for a low-risk type and by 
H
SE CPC  and 
H
SI CPC  for a high-risk type. Note 
that due to adverse selection the long-living individuals make more provision for retirement, 
therefore their consumption possibility curves are above those of the short-living.  
 
 




2 c ) the slope 











2 π < π . As one can show, this property implies that, irrespective of the 
regime, the optimal combination for a type-L individual is to the right of the point of 
intersection of her consumption possibility curves 
L
SE CPC  and 
L


















Figure 3  20
consumption bundle for a type-H individual lies to the left of the intersection of 
H
SE CPC  and 
H
SI CPC . Consequently, since the simultaneous regime allows higher consumption 
possibilities to the right of the point of intersection, it is preferred by a type-L individual. The 
opposite holds for a type-H individual. 
 
This result conforms with the intuition that the short-living individuals, who put more weight 
on consumption in period one, are indeed better off with that regime which provides more 
consumption in this period (Lemma 7). Conversely, the long-living individuals are better off 
with the sequential regime, which provides more consumption in period two. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Provision for old age can be made through a variety of annuity products, which differ in the 
terms concerning asset accumulation and the payout path. In the present paper we have 
concentrated on annuities which run over a limited time only and have to be supplemented 
by a second contract. This additional contract can either be bought simultaneously with the 
first or later, when an individual knows that she has survived some years of retirement. We 
have characterised demand, given these two possibilities, and we have studied the 
consequences of the adverse-selection phenomenon in this market. The results show that 
only a situation, where all individuals demand sequential contracts represents an equilibrium. 
This is favourable for the high-risk group, while the low-risk group would be better off with the 
simultaneous regime. This result, though derived in a specific framework, shows some 
similarity to conclusions from other models with asymmetric information, where typically the 
low-risk groups do not receive their first-best contract.  
 
The main conclusion from our contribution is that adverse selection has more severe 
consequences on the annuity market than recognised in studies using the standard 
overlapping-generations model. These mainly concentrate on the influence of adverse 
selection on a single rate of return for a uniform period of retirement. By extending this model 
and making the realistic assumption that provision for retirement need not be made through a 
once-and-for-all annuity contract, but can be made through different contracts for earlier and 
later phases of retirement, one finds that adverse selection also affects the choice of 
contracts as well as the existence and properties of equilibria.  
   21
Two important assumptions were used in this study in order to derive the results: logarithmic 
utility and the possibility of credible commitment. The former one is essentially a technical 
assumption, allowing us to construct a framework, which is sufficiently simple to derive the 
definite results in Section 3. Considering the intuition provided below Lemma 6, it appears 
quite likely that the relations stated in this Lemma hold for a broader class of utility functions. 
Ultimately, the important relation that drives the final result is  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R , that is, for period-
two contracts the problem of adverse selection is relieved in the sequential regime, 
compared to the simultaneous regime. The reason is that in the sequential regime insurance 
goes via period 1 where the high-risk individuals are in a common pool with the low-risk 
individuals, who put more weight on the first period of retirement than on the second. Indeed, 
numerical simulations using an isoleastic per-period utility function have shown that the 
relation  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R  holds generally for any isoleastic per-period utility function. 
 
On the other hand, the assumption that insurance companies can credibly commit to offer an 
insurance contract at a fixed price one period later is essential to establish the sequential 
regime as an equilibrium. Without commitment, one would have to introduce some way of 
how beliefs concerning the expected price of a future contract are formulated. At fist glance, 
in such a formulation the occurrence of uncertainty would make future contracts less 
attractive, and, as a consequence, the sequential regime less likely to represent an 
equilibrium.  
 
It is well-known that the observed data from the private annuity market reveal puzzling 
peculiarities. The most frequently mentioned is that people buy considerably less annuity 
contracts than one would expect, given their higher return compared to that on other forms of 
wealth (see, e.g., Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990). Another one is the wide-spread use of 
so-called "years certain" contracts
11, which is also difficult to explain within a standard model 
of household decision. Given the result of our analysis that using time-limited contracts in the 
sequential regime represents an equilibrium, the observed fact, mentioned in the 
introduction, that time-limited contracts make up only a small share of all actually purchased 
annuities adds another puzzle: in fact the majority of individuals buy life annuities for the 
whole period of retirement altogether, which can be interpreted as the simultaneous regime 
in our model. A possible explanation could be seen in the lack of commitment as discussed 
                                                  
11  These contracts offer guaranteed for a fixed number periods (possibly to descendants), and then regular 
payouts until death. Obviously, their price is higher than that of annuities without a guaranteed payout phase.    22
above. A further crucial issue of our analysis is the range of annuity contracts or their 
combinations available to the individuals. Further research is needed in order to clarify the 
functioning of the market, if additional types of contracts, for instance packages of first- and 




Proof of Lemma 1:  
By use of the equations in (2.8a), (2.9) and (2.10), equation (2.6) can be written as 
ii i i i i i
1 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 122 2 QQu( w QA RD ) ( A, Q, D ) D 0 ′ −− − + π ∂ ϕ ∂ = , where the first term on the LHS in 
general will not be equal to the term 
ii
201 1 2 2 Ru ( w QA RD) ′ −− −  of the equation in (2.7a). As 
we know that (2.6) must always be fulfilled, this means that the equations in (2.7a) and (2.8a) 
cannot hold simultaneously. By the same reasoning, one observes that if (2.8a) holds, (2.7b) 
can be fulfilled only if R2 ≥ Q1Q2, and analogously for (2.7a) and (2.8b).   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Part (i): We denote by 
i W  the LHS of (2.6) and by 
i V  the LHS of the equation in (2.8a), 
where 
i
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due to (2.9), where 
ii
212 A (A ,Q ) denotes annuity demand 
i
2 A  for fixed 
ii
11 AA = , determined by 
(2.8a). Hence, 
ii i
212 1 A( A, Q) A ∂∂  is derived from implicit differentiation of (2.8a) as 
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, denoting the price elasticity of demand 
ii
212 A (A ,Q ) for fixed 
i
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> _ 0 ⇔ 
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> _  −1, 
ii
212 (A ,Q ) 0 ε < . (A13) 
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Part (ii): Let now denote W
i and V
i the LHS's of (2.6) and (2.7a), resp. With  0 A
i
2 =  these 




101 1 2 211 Qu' ( w QA RD ) u' ( A) 0 , −− − + π =  (A20) 
 
ii i i i
20 1 1 2 21 22 Ru ' ( w QA RD) u ' ( D) 0 . −− − + π π =  (A21) 
 
The formula for implicit differentiation of these equations is the same as (A1), when 
i
2 A i s  
replaced by 
i
2 D  and Q2 by R2.  
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, (A26)   25
where the positive sign follows immediately from easy calculation by use of (A21) and (A23). 
One derives immediately, using (A15) – (A19), together with (A22) – (A26) and by some 
straightforward computations:  
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Further, we find that 
 
 
i ii i i i i
ii 212
20 1 1 ii i
11 1 1 11 1
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Substituting the price elasticity of demand 
ii
121 A (D ,Q ) for fixed 
i
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 (differentiate (A21) implicitly) to determine the 
sign of 
i
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2 0 η < . (A30) 
   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Part (i): We define W
i and V
i as in the proof of Lemma 2, part (i). The formula for implicit 
differentiation of (2.6) and the equation in (2.8a) is the same as in (A1), where Q1,Q2 are 




1 π π  resp. 
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ii i 12 212 1 2 1 2
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Qu( c) 0
w Qu( c) u( c )
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,   (A32) 
 
due to (2.9), where 
ii
212 2 A( w, Q) / ∂∂ π  (denoting the change of annuity demand for fixed 
i
1 w,  i f  
i
2 π  increases), is determined by implicit differentiation of the equation in (2.8a). 
 
Furthermore:  



















Using these computations (A31) – (A33), together with (A2), (A3), (A6), (A7) and (A14) in 
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21 2 1 2
A( Q , Q) 1V WW V
() 0
N AA
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= −− + >
∂π ∂ ∂π ∂ ∂π
. 
 
Part (ii): We define W
i and V
i as in part (ii) of Lemma 2 and use the same formula (A1) for 
implicit differentiation of (A20), (A21), where 
i
2 A,  Q 1, Q2 are replaced by 
i
2 D,  
i
1 π , 
i
2 π  resp. 
 










































Using these computations (A34) and (A35), together with (A22), (A24) and (A26), in (A27) – 
(A30), it follows [note that 
ii i
21 2 12 R u'(c ) Q u'(c ) =π  due to (A20) and (A21)]: 
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Proof of Lemma 6:  











 ,   (A36) 
  which is larger than  1 ρ , as 
H
2 π  > 
L
2 π . By use of (3.4) and the second equation in (3.8), 









 ,   (A37) 
  which is larger than  2 ρ , as 
H
1 π  > 
L
1 π . By use of the first equation in (3.8) and (3.10) and 











 ,   (A38) 
  which is smaller than  2 ρ , as 
H
2 π  > 
L
2 π . 
 
(ii)  First, we calculate the difference ( i
1 Q  −  1 Q ) from the first equations in (3.9) and (3.12) as 













,   (A39) 
  which is positive due to  1 ~ ρ  >  1 ρ  and 
H
1 π  > 
L
1 π .  
 
  Next, we show that  i
2 Q >   2 R : Using the second equations in (3.9), (3.12) and (A37), the 
price ratio  i
2 2 R Q  can be written as  










  which is smaller than 1 due to  1
i
1 < π , for i = L,H.  
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Finally, we show that  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R , which is equivalent to  i i
12 2 QR Q 0 − < . Substituting 
the first equation of (3.9) and (A40) into the difference  i i
12 2 QR Q −  yields (after some 
easy steps of calculations) 
   i
i
HL
21 1 1 2
1
2 21
R( ) ( )
Q
(1 )(1 ) Q






  which is negative, since 
H
1 π  > 
L
1 π and  2 ρ  >  1 ~ ρ . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 7:  
(i)  This result follows from the fact that 
i
11 QA   = 
i
11 QA  +  
i
22 R D : substituting the first equation 
in (3.8) and  0 D
i
2 =  into (2.1) gives the same consumption level 
i
0 c  as substituting the 
both equations in (3.13) into (2.1).   
 
(ii)  Substituting both equations in (3.8) into (2.2) as well as the first equation in (3.11) and 
i
2 A0 =  into (2.2) gives  
 
   ii ii i i i i ii i
12 12 2 12 1 11 2i c( Q, Q ) A( Q, Q ) QA ( Q, Q ) X Q =− =  ;   (A42) 
  
ii
112 112 i 1 c( Q, R ) A( Q, R ) X Q == .   (A43) 
 
  Due to Lemma 6 (ii),  i
1 Q  >  1 Q , and it follows that  i i ii
12 11 1 2 c( Q, Q) c( Q, R) < . 
 
(iii) Substituting the second equation in (3.7) and  0 D
i
2 =  into (2.3) as well as (3.14) and 
i
2 A0 =  into (2.3) yields  
 
   ii ii i i ( ) ii i
12 12 1 2 22 2 i c ( Q, Q ) A ( Q, Q ) X QQ == π  ;   (A44) 
  
iii
21 2 21 2 2 i 2 c ( Q, R ) D( Q, R ) X R == π .   (A45) 
 
  Due to Lemma 6 (ii),  i i
12 QQ  <  2 R , and it follows that  i i ii
12 22 1 2 c( Q , Q) c( Q , R) > . Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 




1 c , c ) in both 
regimes lie to the right of the point of intersection of the consumption possibility curves (3.14) 
and (3.15), while the opposite holds true for an individual of type H. From this we conclude 
that an individual of type L prefers the simultaneous regime with prices  12 Q ,R , while an 
individual of type H prefers the sequential regime with prices  i i
12 Q, Q .   29
 
We calculate the point of intersection of the possibility curves of an individual i = L,H, under 
both regimes by solving (3.14) and (3.15) for 
i
















As a preparation, we show in step (i) that  i i LL
12 11 c( Q , Q) c( S ) 0 − >  and in step (ii) that 
HH
11 2 1 c( Q , R) c( S ) 0 −< .  
 
(i) By use of (A42) and (A46) for i = L, we calculate the difference  i i LL
12 11 c( Q , Q) c( S ) − , which 
can be written as 






12 1 1 11 1 2
12 2 21
R X
c( Q , Q) c( S ) [ ( Q Q) ( Q ) ]
Q( R QQ) Q
−= − + π −
−
 (A47) 
  First note from Lemma 6 (ii) that  i i
12 2 RQ Q0 − >  and  i
1 1 QQ < , hence  i
2 21 RQ Q0 −> . It 
follows that  i i LL
12 11 c( Q , Q) c( S ) −  has the same sign as the term in the squared bracket on 
the RHS of (A47), which we denote by  i i i L
11 2 12 2 (Q Q ) (Q R Q ) Ω≡ − +π − . By use of (A39) 
and (A41), together with (A36) and 
HL
21 2 2 ρ ρ= π π [immediate by use of (3.11) and 
(3.13)], Ω can be rewritten – after some easy transformations – as  
  
HH H H
L 22 2 2
12 1 LL L L
22 2 2
11
[( 1)(1 ) ( )(1 )]
11
+π π +π π
Ω=λ − + ρ +π − +ρ
+π π +π π
 (A48) 






(1 )(1 )(1 )
π− πρ
λ≡
+ρ +ρ +ρ 
, (A49) 
 
  which is positive, as 
HL
11 π> π . Further computations of (A48) yields  
  
HH H H H
LH LH 22 2 2 2
22 1 22 LL L L L
22 2 2 2
11 1 1
[( 1 ) ( )]
11 1 1
+π +π +π π +π
Ω = λ− + π− π + ρ− + π− π
+π +π +π π +π
, (A50) 
  which reduces to (note that the first term in the parenthesis on the RHS of (A40) is equal 











  From (A51), together with (A49), it is immediate that Ω  >  0, which proves that 
ii LL
12 11 c( Q , Q) c( S ) 0 −> . 
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(ii) By use of (A43) and (A46) for i = H, we calculate the difference 
HH
11 2 1 c( Q , R) c( S ) − , which 








2 HH H 22
11 11 2 1 1 2 1
12 2 2 12 1
RR QX
c( Q , R) c( S ) [ ( Q Q ) Q ( Q ) ]
QQ( R QQ) Q Q
−= − + π −
−
 (A52) 
  From part (i) of this proof we know that  i
2 21 RQ Q0 − > . It follows that 
HH
11 2 1 c( Q , R) c( S ) −  
has the same sign as the term in the squared brackets on the RHS of (A52), which we 
denote by  i i i i H
12 2 1 12 2 12 ( Q Q ) RQ Q ( RQ Q ) Φ≡ − +π − . By use of (A39) − (A41), together 
with (A36) and 
HL
21 2 2 ρρ = ππ  [see part (i)], Φ can be rewritten – after some easy steps of 
transformations – as  
  
HH H H H
LH L H 21 2 2 2
11 2 1 1 1 LL L L
22 2 2
11
[( 1)( ) ( )( )]
11
+π π π +π π
Φ=λ − π + ρ +π π +π ρ −
+π π +π π
 (A53) 
  Further computations of (A53) yields  
  
LH L HH L H H




LH 12 2 2
12 2 LL L
22 2






π+ π π π+ π π π π
Φ=λ −π + − +
+π +π π
π π +π +π
+ρ − + π − π
π+ π + π
 (A54) 
  which reduces to (note that the last term in the parenthesis on the RHS of (A54) is equal 









Φ=− λ π −π
+π π
. (A55) 
  From (A55), together with (A49), it is immediate that  0 Φ < , which proves that 
HH
11 2 1 c( Q , R) c( S ) 0 −< . 
 
Finally we know from Lemma 7 that  i i HH
12 11 1 2 c( Q , Q) c( Q , R) < , which together with 
HH
11 2 1 c( Q , R) c( S ) <  implies that for both regimes consumption lies to the left of the point of 
intersection  ) S ( c
H
1  of the consumption possibility curves of both regimes. As to the left of 
) S ( c
H
1  the consumption set is larger for the sequential regime than for the simultaneous 
regime, it follows that the type-H individuals are better off with the sequential regime.  
 
Similarly,  ii LL
12 11 2 1 c( Q , R) c( Q , Q) >  and  i i LL
12 11 c( Q , Q) c( S ) >  (see step (i) and and Lemma 7) 
imply, by analogous reasoning, that the type-L individuals are better off with the 
simultaneous regime.  Q.E.D. 
 
   31
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